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Commentary

Segmented Rankings For Segmented Markets
RAFAEL GELY*
INTRODUCTION

A joke frequently told by and about economists begins with a group of colleagues
searching one night under a lamppost for a key in a gutter. A bystander asks the group
where they have lost the key. The economists explain that although they had lost the
key in a gutter some distance away, they were looking under the lamppost because the
light was better there.1 The three articles in this panel remind me of this story, albeit in
a non-conventional way. By exploring issues regarding the broader context in which
rankings exist, the three articles encourage us to look not at rankings themselves but at
the world around them. In that way, the articles provide new and important insights
about rankings and the market for legal education.
Using the three articles as a foundation, I argue that the underlying problem with the
existing rankings regime is the assumption that law schools compete in a single, unified
market, and that it is thus appropriate to impose a national ranking on all the schools. I
propose that a segmented rankings system, one that is more consistent with the way the
market for legal education actually functions, will better serve the relevant
constituencies. In Part I, I briefly summarize the key insights of the three articles. Part
II describes my proposal.
I. MAJOR INSIGHTS
Let me start first with the articles' major contributions. In The Rat Race as an
Information-ForcingDevice,2 Professors Scott Baker, Stephen J. Choi, and Mitu

Gulati propose that rankings can be understood as an information-forcing device, what
they refer to as a "revelation tournament."3 A revelation tournament has two stages. In
stage one, "candidates" compete based on some "objective, easily observable
criteria. ''4 In stage two, the decision makers evaluate the winners of stage one based not
only on the objective criteria, but on some other "hard-to-observe" subjective
information that came to light during the first stage of the tournament. The authors then
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1. Hussein Kassim & Catherine Waddams Price, PrincipalAgent Relationshipsand UK
Regulated Utilities, 76 ANNALS PUB. & COOPERATIVE ECON. 1 (2005).
2. Scott Baker, Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, The Rat Race as an Information Forcing
Device, 81 IND. L. J. 53 (2006).

3. The authors have developed their tournament's framework in some prior work. See
Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL L. REv. 299 (2004); Stephen
Choi & Mitu Gulati, Choosingthe Next Supreme Court Justice:An EmpiricalRanking ofJudge
Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 23 (2004).

4. See Baker et al., supra note 2, at 62.
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apply their tournament model to two employment-related settings (partner decisions at
law firms and tenure decisions at law schools), a political appointments process
(appointment of Supreme Court justices), and to law school rankings.
As Professors Baker, Choi, and Gulati note, their article makes both positive and
normative contributions to our understanding of incentive structures in a variety of
promotion situations and even in the rankings contexts. In particular, the article helps
explain the apparent puzzle as to why promotion decisions in so many employment
settings are based on criteria that appear to be less important and seemingly unrelated
to the actual goals of the specific jobs. The answer provided by Professors Baker,
Choi, and Gulati is that the seemingly unrelated-yet objective and easily verifiable
information-provided early in the tournament serves first to screen out some
candidates, but, more importantly, forces the revelation of other information. That
other information-information which is subjective and much more difficult to
obtain-is the kind of information the decision makers truly need to make promotion
decisions.
I was particularly interested in the choice of language used by the authors. Notice
the authors' use of the term "revelation" instead of the term "revealing." This
distinction is important, I think. "Revelation" can be defined as "an enlightening or
astonishing disclosure", 5 implying that neither party knows about the true state of
affairs of what has just been revealed. On the other hand, "to reveal" is defined as "to
make something secret or hidden publicly or generally known" or "to open up to
view." 6 Thus, "revealing" is suggestive of a situation in which the party doing the
revealing knows about the state of affairs of what he or she is about to disclose. 7 If my
understanding of a revelation tournament is accurate, a tournament then creates a
situation in which the decision maker is not the only one learning some new
information about the candidate, but the candidate is learning some new information as
well.
Herein is the major insight I gained from this paper. A rankings system might force
law schools to reveal information that they know, but, more importantly, might also
serve as a sort of "revelation" for law schools. To the extent that the same forces that
operate in revelation tournaments were to operate in the rankings world, rankings
might help law schools to understand themselves better as well as gain a better
perspective of their place and role in the marketplace.
I should point out that Professors Baker, Choi, and Gulati might not share my
perspective in this regard, since they conclude their article with a much-guarded view
of the effectiveness of rankings as a revelation tournament. In particular, the authors
note that rankings might not serve as effective revelation tournaments for at least two
reasons. First, they argue that, unlike the situation in most employment settings, law
school rankings might not produce any "subjective, otherwise hard-to-obtain
information.",8 The authors are also concerned that the diffuse nature of the decision

5. A. Merriam-Webster, NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1975).
6. Id.
7. Professors Baker, Choi, and Gulati note that some of the information involved in
tournaments is information not known to the candidate. I will suggest that even if the candidate
knows that he or she possesses a given characteristic such as honesty, the candidate may not
know whether he or she will behave honestly in certain conditions.
8. Baker et al., supra note 2, at 80.
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makers in the law school rankings context creates a collective action problem which
makes whatever information is generated in stage one of the tournament rather useless.
Professors Michael Sauder and Wendy Espeland begin their article, Strength In
Numbers? The Advantages of Multiple Rankings, with the somber assessment that we
live in what they describe as an "audit culture." 9 Thus, they remind us that rankings are
here to stay, and that it is important to evaluate the consequences
of rankings and to
10
"devise strategies for mitigating their most damaging effects."
Professors Sauder and Espeland argue that in the law school world, the problems
associated with rankings are aggravated by the fact that there is one dominant rankings
system: US. News & World Report ("US. News"). In particular, they identify three
problems with a single-ranker system: small changes and small differences gain
1
disproportionate importance;"
loss of reputational control;' 2 and uncritical use of
3
consumers.'
by
rankings
Contrary to the situation in law schools, Professors Sauder and Espeland note that in
business schools none of these three problems are as severe. The difference, they
argue, is that unlike the situation in the law school context, there are at least six highly
influential business school rankings and several others that receive considerable
attention.14 The existence of multiple rankings, each one defining educational quality in
a different way, reduces the magnitude of the effect of the three problems associated
with a dominant-ranker system. In particular, multiple rankings create "an ambiguous
signal about where schools stand in relation to one another" while still providing some
useful information. 5 For example, multiple rankings diminish the concerns regarding
lack of control over the reputation of a school. According to the authors, multiple
rankings allow business school administrators to explain away bad performance
in one
6
ranking by pointing out possible improvements in alternative rankings.'
Professors Sauder and Espeland argue that, given that rankings are here to stay, the
best solution to the single-ranker problem presented by US. News's dominance in the
law school context is the proliferation of alternative, competing rankings.' 7 As with
business schools, multiple rankings will help to minimize the problems associated with
a single-ranker system.
The argument developed by Professors Sauder and Espeland is based on two
underlying assumptions. First, the authors correctly assume that multiple rankings
provide some useful information about the quality of the service provided by the
educational institution; that is, rankings create ambiguity because they create difference
metrics, not because they create noise. This is not to say, of course, that rankings are

9. Michael Sauder & Wendy Nelson Espeland, Strength in Numbers? The Advantages of
Multiple Rankings, 81 IND. L. J. 205, 206 (2006).
10. Id..
11. Seeid.at212-213.
12. See id. at 214-215.
13. This problem occurs when the various constituencies the law school serves treat the
rankings "like the bible" or as if they were "written in stone." Id. at 216.
14. See id. at 218.
15. Id.at219.
16. See id. at 222 (discussing how a dean of a business school responded to unfavorable
rankings in one publication by pointing out favorable rankings in other publications).
17. See id. at 207.
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perfect, and that there are not problems with most, if not all, ranking methodologies.
The point is that rankings create different ways of measuring quality, and that the
consumers of rankings might find that information useful. If this argument is correct,
then the current single-ranker system is having a negative effect on the production and
flow of information. Multiple rankings might not only alleviate the problems that law
schools face because of one dominant ranker, but will have the added effect of
increasing the amount, and perhaps the quality, of information available in the legal
education market. Second, the argument developed by Professors Sauder and Espeland
also appears to be based on the proposition that it will be counterproductive to force a
"market" as varied and rich in information as the business schools market, and
similarly the law schools market, to a single-ranker system. By forcing such a market to
a system with a dominant ranker, we will be losing valuable information and
consequently not serving the informational needs of consumers.
Finally, in Student Quality as Measuredby LSA TScores: MigrationPatternsin the
U.S. News Rankings Era, Professors William D. Henderson and Andrew P. Morriss
develop, as far as I know, the first model of a market for high-Law School Admission
Test (LSAT) students.' 8 The authors seek to identify the factors that help explain why
some law schools have been able to increase their LSAT medians since 1992 while
others have not. In addition to every published input variable from US. News since
1992 (e.g., Median LSAT, Academic Reputation, and Percentile Rank), the authors
include a number of variables believed to be relevant to the market for high-LSAT
students. Some of these variables are the conditions in the relevant labor market,
characteristics of the law schools that may influence their ability to respond to market
changes, and characteristics of the relevant legal education market.
The authors provide a list of six results, which I think are best summarized by their
first result, that there is a "[c]lear [d]ifference in the [m]arket for [s]tudents [b]etween
'Tier ' [top 50 schools] and the [r]est of the [l]aw [s]chool [w]orld.' 9 Professors
Henderson and Morriss thus make clear what I argue, as well as what was alluded to in
the article by Professors Sauder and Espeland: there is segmentation in the market for
legal education.
II. A BRIEF PROPOSAL
My brief proposal is based on this very idea of market segmentation, and
incorporates insights from each of these three fascinating articles. Let me first define
the problem: US. News has treated the legal education market as one big, unified,
single market. On the suppliers' side, all law schools have been treated as competing
against each other in the delivery of legal education. On the consumers' side, students
and law firms have been treated as interested in buying from each of the suppliers. I
would like to suggest that the legal education market is a segmented market.
As Professors Henderson and Morriss find, there are clear differences between the
markets faced by top tier and non-top tier schools. Their finding implies that law

18. William D. Henderson & Andrew P. Morriss, Student Quality as Measuredby LSAT
Scores: MigrationPatternsin the U.S. News Rankings Era, 81 IND. L. J. 163 (2006).
19. Id. at 182.
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schools, at least in these two broad segments, are not competing with each other;
instead, law schools are competing in some narrower, identifiable segments.
Similarly, on the consumer side, I think that students do not come into the market
willing and able to buy from any supplier, but that they have narrowed their options
substantially. Applicants to law school (whether with high or low LSAT scores) do not
apply to every law school to which they have a good opportunity to get in. This
suggests that to the extent students use rankings to somehow process all the
information that is out there regarding law schools, applicants do not need, or want to,
know about every law school, but about a somewhat smaller set of schools.
If the above is correct, a ranking system that creates appropriate market segments,
and then ranks schools in that segment, might serve both the interests of producers and
consumers and improve over existing methodologies. In fact, in its undergraduate
ranking system, U.S. News recognizes this idea of segmentation. Using a classification
system developed by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching,2 °
they place universities in four distinct groups: National Universities, 21 Liberal
Arts
24
23
Colleges, 22 Universities-Masters, and Comprehensive Colleges-Bachelors.
The first step toward the implementation of this proposal is to identify the potential
basis to segment the market. There is extensive academic literature on marketing which
describes the basis for identifying market segments.25 In general, market segments
26
should be measurable, accessible, substantial, and have unique needs and durability.
According to one scheme, markets could be segmented according to geography,
demographics, psychographics (segmentation based on customer lifestyle), and
behavior (segmentation based on customer behavior towards products).27
In the context of legal education there are a variety of options. Professors
Henderson and Morriss have, of course, identified the divide between "Tier 1"and the

20. Lee S. Shulman, Forewordto THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
TEACHING, CARNEGIE CLASSIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION, at vii

OF

(2000),

availableat http://www.camegiefoundation.org/Classification/CIHE2000/foreword.htm ("The

Classification has been widely used for unintended purposes as well, some benign and others
not. U.S. News & World Report uses the Classification to organize its influential college
rankings.").
21. These are institutions that "offer a full range of undergraduate majors, as well as

master's and doctoral degrees; many strongly emphasize research." Ranking Category
AMERICA'S BEST GRADUATE SCHOOLS 2006 (2005), http://www.usnews.com/

Definitions, in

usnews/edu/college/rankings/about/comkdfs-brief.php.

22. These are institutions that "emphasize undergraduate education and award at least 50
percent of their degrees in the liberal arts." Id.
23. These are institutions that "provide a full range of undergraduate programs and some
master's level programs" but "offer few, if any, doctoral programs." Id.
24. These are institutions that focus primarily on undergraduate education, but degrees in
liberal arts disciplines constitute less than 50 % of the degrees awarded and they offer a range of
degree programs in professional fields such as business, nursing, and education. Id.
25. See generally Yoram Wind, Issues and Advances in Segmentation Research, 15 J.
MARKETING RES. 317 (1978) (summarizing segmentation research).

26. See Netmba.com, Market Segmentation, www.netmba.com/marketing/
market/segmentation/ (last visited August 1, 2005) (describing the basis for market segmentation

analysis).
27. Id.
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rest of the law school world as one possible basis for segmenting the market.28 In the
alternative, and following up on Professor Sunstein's idea of relying on student choices
(revealed preferences), one could let the students identify the relevant segments.29 The
Law School Admissions Council (LSAC) provides law schools with information about
what they refer to as overlap deposits. 30 Law schools participating in this service
receive from the LSAC information on the number of admitted applicants who have
paid deposits to the participating school as well as other schools. The report identifies
the other school, although it does not identify the individual students. For example, as
the summer comes to a close we will know at Cincinnati how many of our
approximately 140-150 possible admitted students have paid deposits only at our
school, and how many have paid multiple deposits. Over the years, fairly clear patterns
emerge regarding the schools with which tend to appear in that list. Our list tends to
include several of the other Ohio law schools, some of the major law schools in the
Midwest, and a few other schools across the country. This information, I argue, could
reflect what students consider to be cohorts of schools that they consider to represent
relevant markets. These cohorts could become the basis of market segments which then
could be subject to some form of ranking.
Yet another possible way of segmenting the market could be based on a
combination of "national" and "regional" segments. It is clear that there are some law
schools with constituency groups (students, law firms, alumni, etc.) that operate at a
national level. They draw applicants from all over the country, and perhaps from all
over the world. They place students in jobs nationally and internationally. Other law
schools serve markets that can be characterized in more regional or perhaps local
terms. It seems rather strained to force schools at these two very opposite ends of the
geographic placement spectrum into one ranking system.
One possible solution would be to allow schools to sort themselves into one
"national" and several "regional" rankings, where the "regional" rankings will match
the school against more relevant competitors in the various categories. Of course, it is
possible that none of the schools will choose to be in the regional rankings, preferring
instead to compete in the national rankings. Although this is possible, I think that there
might be forces operating in the opposite direction. Professors Baker, Choi and
Gulati's notion of a revelation tournament suggests that rankings can serve as a way for
a law school to find out more about itself as it reveals information to the public. By, for
example, giving schools the option to opt out of a national ranking and participate in a
different segment ranking, the school will be forced to think carefully about what
constituency it serves, what it sees as its main mission, and how it wants to be
perceived in the relevant community.

28. Henderson & Morriss, supra note 18, at 182.
29. See Cass R. Sunstein, Ranking Law Schools: A Market Test?, 81 IND. L. J. 25 (2006).
30. Interview with Al Watson, Assistant Dean of Admissions, University of Cincinnati
College of Law, in Cincinnati, Ohio (Mar. 2005).

